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The “variance hypothesis” predicts that external search breadth leads to innovation outcomes,
but people have limited attention for search and cultivating breadth consumes attention. How
does individuals’ search breadth affect innovation outcomes? How does individuals’ allocation
of attention affect the efficacy of search breadth? We matched survey data with complete patent
records, to examine the search behaviors of elite boundary spanners at IBM. Surprisingly,
individuals who allocated attention to people inside the firm were more innovative. Individuals
with high external search breadth were more innovative only when they allocated more attention
to those sources. Our research identifies limits to the “variance hypothesis” and reveals two
successful approaches to innovation search: “cosmopolitans” who cultivate and attend to external
people and “locals” who draw upon internal people. © 2014 The Authors. Strategic Management
Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Most theories of innovation search recognize
that the breadth of external search is important
to identifying new ideas (Gibbons and Johnston,
1974; von Hippel, 1988; Jeppesen and Lakhani,
2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and
Helfat, 2011; March, 1991). The “variance hypoth-
esis” predicts that exposure to diverse sources of
information (e.g., Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004;
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996) provides
the “requisite variety” of ideas and knowledge
needed to create innovations. The breadth of
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external search also helps increase the likelihood of
a successful payoff given the risk and uncertainty
associated with innovation endeavors (Leiponen
and Helfat, 2011). What is less recognized is
that cultivating a broad external search has an
opportunity cost as it takes attention away from
other activities internal to the firm.
Individuals who span organizational boundaries
(Allen, 1977) to search for new innovations must
decide how to allocate their attention across mul-
tiple search sources. The boundary-spanning liter-
ature has a long history investigating the types of
individuals likely to form ties that span organiza-
tional boundaries (Tushman and Scanlan, 1981) and
their effects on team (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992;
Marrone, Tesluk, and Carson, 2007) and organi-
zational performance (Dollinger, 1984). But this
research does not tend to acknowledge that those
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who bridge boundaries in the search for innovative
ideas do so at the expense of other activities. While
the variance hypothesis has robust support at firm,
team, and individual levels, few theories of innova-
tion have accounted for the time needed to cultivate
a broad external search and how this may affect
innovation outcomes. Thus, our research examines
exactly this question: How does individuals’ search
breadth affect innovation outcomes?How does indi-
viduals’ allocation of attention affect the efficacy of
search breadth?
At the firm level, variance in search sources
hedges risk. Firms can manage the allocation of
attention between internal and external search
sources by cultivating a portfolio of different
initiatives that pursue search strategies with
different risk profiles. “By accessing a greater
number of knowledge sources, the firm improves
the probability of obtaining knowledge that will
lead to a valuable outcome” (Leiponen and Helfat,
2011: 225). Thus, organizations rarely conduct
one monolithic approach to innovation search but,
rather, pursue a distributed approach, allocating
individuals to explore various domains. The task
of searching for new ideas is inherently a human
one: organizations cannot themselves “search”
(Li et al., 2013)—although a firm’s leadership
and strategic direction can set the search agenda.
The actual conduct of a successful search for
innovations depends “on the individuals who stand
at the interface of … the firm and the external
environment” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 132).
Yet, the search patterns of individuals are not
well understood (Gruber, Harhoff, and Hoisl, 2013;
Maggitti, Smith, and Katila, 2013; Salter et al.,
forthcoming), and this has consequences for the
assumptions theorists make about how innovation
search accumulates at the organizational level.
Individuals live within the same 24-hour day and
cannot, like a firm, hedge against the risk embedded
in many different search strategies to achieve inno-
vative results. To innovate effectively, individuals
need to figure out how to allocate their attention to
a variety of external information sources while still
focusing on the internal needs of the organization
so that ideas sourced externally will have relevance
for the firm. Thus, at the individual level, “attention
should play an important role in the search for and
development of innovative ideas” (Koput, 1997:
533).
Attention-based theories of the firm recog-
nize that the attention of both individuals and
organizations is a scarce resource and that any
allocation of attention has an opportunity cost
(Ocasio, 1997, 2011). Attending to information
sources inside the firm takes away from ideas
outside the firm and vice versa. Thus, we suspect
that the attention individuals give to search breadth
affects the efficacy of their search. Attention-based
theories typically focus on how leaders influence
or direct the attention of organization members
(Li et al., 2013). How individuals allocate their
attention among search sources and how this affects
innovation outcomes has not been explored. This is
a critical research gap because in dynamic and com-
petitive environments (e.g., Martin and Eisenhardt,
2010) centralized search is not likely to be effective
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Search is more likely
to be conducted by individuals straddling the firm
and its environment (e.g., Dokko and Rosenkopf,
2010; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Although
theorists like to talk about “innovation landscapes”
or “terrains,” Maggitti et al.’s (2013) in-depth
exploration of individual inventors did not find
these metaphors relevant to individuals’ search pro-
cesses. Rather, inventors emphasized “information
comprehensiveness and acquisition of up-to-date
knowledge as on-going”—a challenge to maintain
for anyone hoping to create something novel.
Thus, our question as to how individuals’ allo-
cation of attention to different information sources
affects innovation search is central to understand-
ing how individuals navigate the innovation search
process, which ultimately accumulates at the firm
level. What is needed is empirical research on how
individuals engaged in innovation search allocate
their finite attention and how this affects their abil-
ity to manage search breadth. Thus, we examined
how individuals in key innovative search roles drew
upon internal and external sources of information,
how this affected their ability to leverage search
breadth, and how divergent search patterns affected
the quantity, novelty, and quality of patents. Doing
so contributes a more nuanced understanding of the
search process at the level where search is con-
ducted and also provides theoretical and empirical
traction as to how individual search behavior varies
in its effect on innovation outcomes.
THE VARIANCE HYPOTHESIS
The variance hypothesis: the belief that greater
exposure to diverse information sources leads to
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more innovative outcomes has relevance at firm,
team, and individual levels, and we consider each
in turn.
Firm
Firms diversify their search strategy and portfolio
to hedge against the inevitable risk associated with
innovation search (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011).
While breadth in a firm’s innovation objectives is
important, breadth in information sources is most
associated with a high rate of successful innova-
tions (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). An increase in
the breadth of a firm’s search strategy “add[s] new
elements to the set, improving the possibilities for
finding a useful combination” (Katila and Ahuja,
2002: 1185). Thus, breadth not only hedges risk,
but also enriches the pool of solutions available to
solve innovation challenges endemic to the firm.
This logic is core to the argument behind open
innovation in terms of the external sourcing of
ideas to the firm (Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander and
Gann, 2010). An early study of the use of scientific
knowledge in industrial innovations found that over
a third of the knowledge in innovations critical
to the firm came from external sources (Gibbons
and Johnston, 1974). More recently, firms like
Procter & Gamble have set targets for the external
sourcing of ideas—aiming to secure 50 percent
of the ideas for novel products from outside the
firm and allocating innovation scouts to realize
that goal (Huston and Sakkab, 2006). A broad
external search is viewed as vital to the sourcing of
innovative ideas that P&G can bring to market to
foster organic growth for the firm.
At the firm level, broad external networks benefit
firms’ growth and performance (Owen-Smith and
Powell, 2004; Powell et al., 1996). The greater the
breadth of partners firms interact with, the greater
the innovation outcomes (Laursen and Salter, 2006).
External partners can be considered a type of search
channel that provides different sources of informa-
tion but also requires different norms of exchange.
Thus, cultivating external search breadth across
multiple types of partners takes significant effort.
Laursen and Salter (2006: 133) suggest that “the
concept of search channels shifts attention toward
the type and number of pathways of exchange
between a firm and its environment rather than
toward the degree of its interaction within each of
these search channels. In doing so, it focuses atten-
tion on the variety of channels used by the firm in its
search activities.” We would argue that the concept
of search channels should also draw attention to the
human resources needed to cultivate those channels.
Typically, it is individuals who will be responsible
for developing and managing external search chan-
nels in order to extract value for the firm.
Team
At the team level, exploration of the variance
hypothesis tends to examine either the composi-
tion of the team or the diversity of search sources
explored by the team. Teams with greater diversity
in member composition experience higher rates of
productivity (Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001), cre-
ativity, and innovation (Austin, 1997; Bantel and
Jackson, 1989; McLeod, Lobel, and Cox, 1996).
Variance in scientific and technical teams’ expertise
enhances innovation outcomes (Singh and Fleming,
2010) and contributes to higher rates of innovation
breakthroughs (Fleming, Mingo, and Chen, 2007;
Hargadon, 2005). In addition to team composi-
tion, the breadth of external networks matters. Ruef
(2002) found that entrepreneurial teams embed-
ded in heterogeneous networks were more likely
to attempt innovation (as measured by patent and
trademark applications) than entrepreneurial teams
in more homogenous networks. Top management
teams who pursued a more diverse set of search
sources were more likely to introduce novel prod-
ucts (Li et al., 2013). While both approaches exam-
ine how a team’s access to a breadth of information
affects innovation outcomes, it is the diversity of
information sources accessed rather than team com-
position that may be relevant to innovation search at
the individual level.
Individual
The notion that individuals exposed to broad exter-
nal networks will inherit greater knowledge and
facility in both accumulating and taking advantage
of new knowledge is not new and extends from
early work by Gouldner (1957). Gouldner theorized
that, while “locals” demonstrated commitment and
loyalty by orienting themselves to affairs internal
to the organization, “cosmopolitans” oriented to
diverse professional networks outside the organi-
zation benefited from the expertise generated from
their external ties. Gouldner argued that, as a result,
“experts” would have greater opportunities for job
mobility and be less “committed to their employing
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organization than to their specialty” (1957: 288).
While Gouldner did not theorize about external
search breadth per se, he did find that individuals
with a cosmopolitan orientation were more likely
to get intellectual stimulation from sources outside
the organization (1957: 296), which could produce
a broad external network.
When it comes to innovation, prior research
shows that engineers and scientists who have
access to diverse domains of expertise are better
able to apply solutions developed for one domain to
a new domain (Fleming, 2001; Gruber et al., 2013;
Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Singh and Fleming,
2010), enhancing the efficiency of innovation
search. Individuals who bridge heterogeneous
groups of people gain access to unique information
resulting in a “vision advantage” (Burt, 2004: 359).
This vision advantage is also perceived by other
members—Menon and Pfeffer (2003) found that
external sources of information were more valued
by other organizational members as they were
perceived to be more rare than internal sources
of information. Thus, individuals who develop
external search breadth are more likely to access
divergent sources of knowledge that can expand the
population of ideas available to solve innovation
challenges inside the firm (Fleming and Sorenson,
2001; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Reagans and
Zuckerman, 2008; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001;
Salter et al., forthcoming).
Benefits that stem from connecting disparate
knowledge resources in novel ways are limited
when individuals search within their own organiza-
tion (Dearborn and Simon, 1958). Search strategies
that do not extend outside the firm boundary are less
likely to have impact on subsequent technological
evolution (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Maggitti
and colleagues’ examination of inventor’s search
and discovery process found that “it is not always
the depth of knowledge and experience of the
searcher that results in discovery. Rather, it is the
unique breadth of these components in addition
to the ability to draw from seemingly different
terrains and categories to arrive at solutions and
discoveries” (2013: 97, emphasis added). Jeppesen
and Lakhani’s research on the innovation plat-
form InnoCentive 2010 shows that people who
were distant from the knowledge domain where
innovation challenges originated were more likely
to find solutions to those problems than those
closest to the relevant knowledge domain. The
question is, given the finite amount of time that
individuals possess, how much search breadth can
individuals cultivate before the benefits from search
dissipate? How do individuals cultivating external
search breadth balance their attention to external
search with attention to the innovation needs of
the firm? What is missing is an understanding of
how the opportunity costs invoked by the variance
hypothesis affect innovation outcomes at the level
of analysis where search occurs: individuals.
EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF THE
VARIANCE HYPTOHESIS
At the firm level, there are diminishing returns to
external search breadth (Laursen and Salter, 2006;
Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). Too much attention to
searching different external knowledge sources can,
at some point, be detrimental (Koput, 1997: 528)
as firms have a limited absorptive capacity (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). Excess external search can
lead to wasted resources when firms gather more
information than they can use, producing more
knowledge than can be integrated with existing
capabilities (Cyert and March, 1963; Hansen and
Haas, 2001). As external search breadth increases,
“the proportion of new knowledge to be integrated
into a firm’s knowledge base increases [and] so
do the technological and organizational challenges
in integration” (Katila and Ahuja, 2002: 1185). In
this scenario, the costs of integration exceed the
benefits of search breadth. More information is
created than can be screened, processed, or acted
upon: a wealth of information creates a poverty of
attention (Simon, 1997: 40).
If this is the case, then diminishing returns to
external search breadth may be even more relevant
for individuals as they cannot scale themselves
as well as firms and face finite search time. Inno-
vation scholars often neglect what is central for
attention-based scholars—all types of search incur
an opportunity cost. Cultivating external search
breadth can come at the expense of time needed
to understand how external knowledge can be inte-
grated with the firm. Drawing on Simon’s (1997)
observations of how individuals and organizations
experience limits in processing information, the
attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997,
2011) views management’s task as directing peo-
ple’s attention to the core challenges of the firm.
From Ocasio’s perspective, how people direct their
attention is a critical precursor to action: it affects
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the information people will be exposed to and
thus the nature of solutions people bring to bear
to address the firm’s challenges. Thus, how people
allocate their attention is critical to understanding
how individual behavior affects organizational
behavior.
The importance of internal search sources
When it comes to the search for innovations, if peo-
ple simply attend to external information sources,
they may acquire novel ideas but have a diffi-
cult time understanding the firm’s innovation chal-
lenges and lack the social capital needed to have
ideas that are sourced externally accepted and inte-
grated within the firm (e.g., Burt, 2004; Fleming
et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005). Attention to inter-
nal information sources is critical to identifying
opportunities to apply ideas gathered from exter-
nal sources to the firm’s innovation challenges (e.g.,
Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005). Ideas from
external sources often do not transfer well and
can be difficult to integrate with a firm’s existing
activities (Hansen, 1999, 2002). Without engag-
ing with internal collaborators to translate (Bechky,
2003; Carlile, 2004) or persuade colleagues of
the value of external ideas (e.g., Dutton et al.,
2001; Howard-Grenville, 2007), ideas from external
sources can face rejection (Katz and Allen, 1982).
On the other hand, if people devote all their atten-
tion to internal sources of information, they may
limit the variance in ideas to which they are exposed
and fail to introduce novel ideas to the firm, inhibit-
ing innovation. Knowledge from both internal and
external sources is needed to produce novel innova-
tions (Fabrizio, 2009; Gibbons and Johnston, 1974),
but too much attention to internal information
sources may limit the number and range of novel
ideas introduced. As a result, Allen (1977) suggests
that individuals need to be “communication stars”
excelling at maintaining external and internal infor-
mation sources to both cultivate variety and develop
credibility when introducing ideas from outside the
firm. Yet, doing both equally well can be tricky.
The effects of attention on search breadth
Consider that, as an individual’s external network
becomes broader, several choices with respect
to allocating attention unfold. If an individual
allocates the same amount of time per person, the
total time spent across the network will grow in
alignment with the network’s growth. This may not
be a sustainable equilibrium given the need to also
attend to internal search sources. An alternative
is that people devote a specified amount of time
to external networking and, as the breadth of the
network grows, the time devoted to each person is
reduced. The danger of the latter scenario is that
individuals with high external search breadth who
don’t allocate much time to each external person
risk creating “weak” or superficial ties (Carlile,
2004; Hansen, 1999) that may not be rich enough
to allow the depth of knowledge transfer needed
to create novel innovations. While weak ties are
good for some types of information transfer—such
as getting a job (Granovetter, 1973), they are not
always effective at transferring complex informa-
tion (Hansen, 1999). Thus, people who cultivate
broad external networks may need to spend signif-
icant time with their external information sources
to learn how the ideas produced in one domain can
be reused in novel domains (e.g., Hansen, 1999;
Murray and O’Mahony, 2007).
How individuals allocate their attention to inter-
nal and external search sources may thus affect
the degree to which benefits can be extracted from
external search breadth. Individuals who develop
external search breadth without increasing the time
devoted to those ties may not gain enough knowl-
edge to make use of those information sources.
In other words, unless individuals spend adequate
time with the broad search networks they cultivate,
the costs of developing external networks may out-
weigh the benefits. To explore the limits of the vari-
ance hypothesis, with full consideration for individ-
uals’ finite attention, we examined how scientific
and technical professionals in key innovation search
roles allocated their attention to internal and exter-
nal information sources, how much external search
breadth they cultivated, and the effects their search
behavior had on innovation outcomes.
RESEARCH CONTEXT
We situate our study within IBM, a large global
technology and services business with a population
of elite experts dedicated to innovation search. We
composed a theoretical rather than representative
sample (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) of profes-
sionals who are boundary spanners and tasked with
innovation search who had been granted a great deal
of autonomy over their time (see, e.g., Allen, 1977).
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“Theoretical sampling simply means that cases
are selected because they are particularly suitable
for illuminating and extending relationships and
logic among constructs” (Eisenhardt and Graebner,
2007: 27). To assess how individuals allocate their
attention and how this moderates search breadth,
the research sample should meet two criteria: (1)
the sample should be tasked with innovation search
and have autonomy as to how to conduct that
search, and (2) the sample should enable one to
trace how different allocations of attention affect
search breadth and individual innovation outcomes
at a later stage. Our sample meets both criteria but
is nonetheless a very specific case, and our findings
are limited to firms of similar size and scope.
IBM employs more than 400,000 people and
more than half hold scientific or technical qualifi-
cations. IBM has a strong tradition of developing
innovations inside the organization by establishing
technical leadership (Chesbrough, 2003). For
example, IBM holds more patents from the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office than any other orga-
nization and, for 19 consecutive years, has been the
most active patenting organization in the United
States. More recently, IBM has developed an array
of initiatives to enhance collaboration with external
parties to develop novel innovations (Baldwin,
O’Mahony, and Quinn, 2003). In these efforts,
IBM’s leading technical experts and scientists scan
the external environment for novel ideas that the
firm can leverage and apply.
As noted by Gambardella, Panico, and Valen-
tini (2013), firms oftenmotivate knowledgeworkers
by offering them increased autonomy and learning
opportunities. In this regard, autonomous search
roles are the reward. At IBM, this happens in two
ways. High-performing, senior technical experts
can be recognized with two roles: as members of
IBM’s Distinguished Engineers and as members
of the IBM Academy of Technology. Scientists
and engineers within IBM are promoted to Distin-
guished Engineers only when they achieve a solid
record of technical innovation excellence.
Individuals elevated to the title of IBM Dis-
tinguished Engineer must achieve a sustained
record of invention, garnering recognition
across IBM and the industry for insight and
technical expertise. Those honoured possess
either a broad competency across multiple
areas or a deep technical knowledge in one
specific area.
Promotion to a Distinguished Engineer is a
great honor available only to the most talented
technical employees, a position they hold for the
rest of their careers. Rather than take on managerial
responsibilities, they are rewarded with autonomy
to search for new ideas that may be of importance
to IBM (e.g., Allen and Katz, 1986; Gambardella
et al., 2013). Distinguished Engineers are technical
role models whose primary responsibility is to
inject the organization with novel ideas rather than
to manage product teams or have direct operating
responsibility.
Members of the IBM Academy are nominated
and elected by their peers. The IBM Academy,
established in 1989, was modeled on the U.S.
Academies of Science and Engineering. Like
Distinguished Engineers, individuals are appointed
based on their technical accomplishments and
are among IBM’s top technical people. Academy
members are responsible for promoting IBM’s
technical growth and innovation. IBM promotes
about 30 new members annually to spur creative
ideas while older members move on to “emeritus
status.” Although there is no member maxi-
mum, the Academy usually consists of about 300
individuals who “identify and pursue technical
developments and opportunities relevant to IBM’s
business, seeking to improve IBM’s technical base
and its application in successful products, solutions,
and services.” (Source: internal material). As one
Academy of Technology member explained: “Our
job is to figure out what the next [thing] is, to sift
[through] all the possible things, which ones are
going to matter to IBM, and then go and figure out
what is really happening and come back with rec-
ommendations … why we think this matters, how
we think this is going to play out, and where IBM
should fit in.”
Both Distinguished Engineers and Academy
members are granted significant autonomy as to
how they search and spend their time, but may
seek managerial approval as to the broad technical
domains in which they search. For these elites,
innovation search is an ongoing dynamic activity:
“As far as I am concerned [this technology] isn’t
the next thing any more. It is here. Whereas [this
other technology] really is the next thing right now.
A year from now it will be something else.” Thus,
this population provides an excellent opportunity to
examine how individuals’ search behavior affects
innovation outcomes.
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METHODS
With the permission of the Vice President of
Technical Strategy for IBM, we derived a list of
all 460 Distinguished Engineers and 317 IBM
Academy members in 2008. One hundred and
sixty-two individuals were both a Distinguished
Engineer and an Academy member, resulting in a
population of 615 individuals. We surveyed both
cohorts as both are promoted to their roles based
on their innovation track record, and both have
the autonomy to conduct independent innovation
search. As the selection mechanisms differ between
Distinguished Engineers and Academy members,
we control for this in our analyses.
Data collection
We adopted a multimethod approach combining
semi-structured interviews with senior individuals
at IBM and two half-day workshops with eight
Distinguished Engineers and Academy members to
create a survey that would make sense to them.
Respondents were linked to a web page where they
could fill in the survey on one of our servers. In
addition, we retrieved the full U.S. patent records
from all 615 individuals in our population. We
combined self-reported data from the survey with
patent data on innovation outcomes.
Workshops
We organized two workshops to understand our
research context and refine the survey instrument.
The questionnaire was discussed with Distin-
guished Engineers and Academy members to gain
validity by making sure that we used their lan-
guage. Based on the interviews and workshops, we
revised the questions included in the questionnaire.
We pre-tested the questionnaire with workshop
participants and modified the survey instrument.
Survey
We distributed the survey to the 615 individuals in
the population during the second week of February
2008 and kept the survey live for twoweeks.
Following Dillman’s (2000) proposal, we adopted
different tactics to increase the response rate.
We started with questions deemed the easiest to
respond based on feedback from workshop partic-
ipants. Effort was placed on the graphical design
of the survey, to make it attractive to complete
(Dillman, 2000). The survey was accompanied by
an e-mail from the Vice President of Technical
Strategy in IBM and a member of the Board of
Governors of the IBM Academy of Technology,
highlighting the importance of the survey to IBM
and indicating that the survey was approved by the
IBM Employee Survey Review. After distributing
two reminders, we reached an effective response
rate of 53.7 percent. This is a good response rate
given the time constraints of our senior high-level
respondents. We tested for response bias by com-
paring early respondents with late respondents, as
studies have shown that late respondents resem-
ble many characteristics of nonrespondents. We
compared individuals who responded immediately
after we sent the survey with individuals who
responded after the second reminder. Simple t-tests
of the dependent and independent variables did not
indicate any significant differences.
Patent records
We supplemented the survey data with full patent
records for all 615 individuals in the population
for individuals’ complete career history. Using
Thomson’s Delphion database, we downloaded
all U.S. patents in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). With patent information from
all 615 individuals in our population, we assessed
whether there was any selection bias by comparing
the patent rate of individuals who completed the
survey with those who did not. One could expect
more innovative individuals to have a stronger
interest in participating in the survey, which would
not constitute a random sample. Respondents had,
on average, 1.97 patents post-survey while nonre-
spondents had 1.98 patents. A t-test for difference
of means across the two groups confirmed that this
was not statistically significant. These analyses led
us to conclude that our sample was representative of
the target population. Together, the 615 individuals
in our population were awarded more than 10,000
patents over our study period. This is a remarkable
number, and one survey respondent is among
the top 10 most prolific inventors in the USPTO
database over the last 10 years.
This extensive data collection effort avoids the
common-method bias of using only survey data
(Podsakoff et al., 2003: 885). Following Podsakoff
et al.’s (2003) argument, we adopted procedural and
statistical remedies to cope with the potential threat
of common-method bias. Different data sources
© 2014 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J. (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
L. Dahlander, S. O’Mahony, and D. M. Gann
for the dependent and independent variables over-
come part of the problem. We also protected
anonymity, counterbalanced question order, used
different question anchors, and varied the scales.
To test statistically for common-method bias, we
used Harman’s (1976) single factor test, which
included all the survey items used in the paper in
one factor analysis. As no single factor emerged that
accounted for a large proportion of the total vari-
ance, our research does not appear to suffer from
common-method bias.
Variables and measures
While our dependent variables come from the
USPTO database between 2001 and 2013, our inde-
pendent variables come from the survey informed
by workshops with IBM in 2008.
Dependent variables
IBM has a strong culture of patenting behavior
and emphasizes patent protection as a key fac-
tor in their appropriability strategy, consistently
holding more patents than any other firm in the
USPTO, which generate more than US$1 billion
annually in license revenue. Not every great idea
will be patented—IBM supports open source soft-
ware efforts and often makes technical disclosures
in the public domain. However, all IBM employees
are awarded a monetary sumwhen they file a patent.
For patents with over five inventors, patenting teams
share a pooled award. These awards are in place
for all IBM employees and do not change for Dis-
tinguished Engineers or Academy members. Like
Nerkar and Paruchuri (2005), we analyze patents
awarded within a single firm, which allows for
examination of how individual achievements accu-
mulate at the firm level. Patents are produced by
specific individuals and individuals are rewarded for
them, but patent assets are owned by the firm.
Our dependent variable is an individual’s total
number of patents granted inversely weighted by
the number of inventors on the patent. For instance,
a patent with two inventors counts as half for
each individual. We sum the cumulative number of
weighted patents post-survey for each individual,
while controlling for a lagged cumulative depen-
dent variable pre-survey. Thus, our analyses include
a lagged cumulative dependent variable with indi-
viduals’ patents between 2001 and 2007. A lagged
dependent variable can be considered analogous
to a fixed effect that accounts for unobserved het-
erogeneity such as inherent abilities in producing
patents (Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer, 2002).
We conducted two robustness checks that capture
different types of patent outcomes. First, we devel-
oped a second dependent variable: the number of
novel patents inversely weighted by the number of
inventors. Here, we account for the novelty of each
inventor’s patents using the approach developed
by Fleming et al. (2007). Fleming and colleagues
used patent classes to identify whether a patent
included previously uncombined patent subclasses.
Using this logic, patents that use subclasses that
have not been previously combined create a new
technological path for the organization. A patent
has n(n− 1)/2 possible combinations where n is
the number of patent classes. We count the patent
as novel if a patent combines at least one pair of
patent classes new to IBM.
As a second robustness check, we constructed
a third dependent variable to assess whether
our results were affected by the quality of
patents produced. We measured an individual’s
quality-adjusted patents bymeasuring each patent’s
yearly forward citations inversely weighted by the
number of inventors. Forward citations have been
argued to be a good proxy for the quality of patents
as measured by their impact on other patents
(Trajtenberg, 1990). An individual has higher
quality patents the more the patents they invent are
cited by other patents.1 With this measure, we can
account for the fact that some people may have
produced fewer patents but produced patents of
higher quality. As expected, the three dependent
variables were correlated and the results similar
across the different dependent variables. For the
purposes of this paper, we report results for the
quantity of patents as our primary dependent
variable. We run robustness checks using novel
patents and quality-adjusted patents.
Independent variables
Our independent variables were captured in our
pretested survey of Distinguished Engineers and
Academy members administered in early 2008
as well as additional sources explained below. A
summary of all variables, their definitions, and data
sources are found in Table S1 in Appendix S1.
1 Our patent data ends in 2011, and our citation data to patents
ends in 2012.
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External search breadth. Studies of how firms
search for new ideas typically examine a firm’s
engagement with different types of partners
(Laursen and Salter, 2006; Powell et al., 1996) or
information sources (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010) as
a measure of the breadth of their innovation search.
Koput refers to “sources of ideas and information
such as competitors, suppliers, trade associations,
universities, and others” as external stocks of ideas
(1997: 531). Adopting this logic, we measured
external search breadth as the number of different
types of external parties an individual interacted
with. Respondents were provided with a list of 11
different types of partners that could constitute
their external network: (1) business partners, (2)
competitors, (3) consultants, (4) customers and
users, (5) government relations, (6) private research
institutes, (7) professional and trade institutions,
(8) standard setting organizations, (9) suppliers,
(10) universities, or (11) other partners, and were
asked which ones they interacted with. The exter-
nal search breadth variable ranges from 0 to the
maximum of 11 different types of collaborators.
Attention to information sources. We recognized
that different types of information sources may vary
in the search time they take. Thus, we created two
attention measures—one measuring allocation of
attention to external people and one measuring allo-
cation of attention to external written information.
Given the need to acknowledge the finite amount
of time available for search, both measures asked
respondents to distribute 100 points to show how
they allocated their time between external and inter-
nal information sources. By doing so, we forced
survey respondents to recognize the fixed nature of
their time and how allocation to one type of search
source reduced the attention available for another
search source.
Attention to external people. To capture the extent
to which an individual allocated time with people
inside versus outside the firm, we asked respon-
dents to “Please distribute 100 points to indicate
the relative amount of time, during your typical
workday, that you interact with individuals from
each category listed below”: (1) within your orga-
nization (e.g., individuals in your office, organiza-
tional members, etc.), (2) outside your organization
(e.g., customers, suppliers, alliance partners, gov-
ernmental contacts, university contacts, investors,
etc.). We divided the points each individual devoted
to interacting with people outside their organization
by 100. This variable ranges from 0 (only attending
to internal people) to 1 (only attending to external
people). As an alternative measure, we captured the
absolute amount of time our sample devoted to peo-
ple outside IBM.Wemultiplied the relativemeasure
of attention to external peoplewith theminimal time
informants estimated for search: 30 percent of the
number of hours worked per week. This provides a
lower bound of the hours spent on external people.
Attention to external written information. We
asked a similar question with respect to external
written information sources. We measured the rela-
tive time individuals spent searching internal versus
external written information sources with a survey
item that asked: “Please distribute 100 points to
indicate the relative amount of time, during your
typical workday, that you spend in each category
listed below.” The two options were: (1) searching
internal written information sources (e.g., websites,
manuals, firm information), and (2) searching
external written information sources (e.g., written
information about customers, markets, partners,
competitors, etc.). To develop the variable, we
divided the number of points individuals devoted
to external written information outside the orga-
nization by 100. This variable thus ranges from 0
(only attending to internal information) to 1 (only
attending to external written information). To con-
struct an alternative absolute measure of attention
to external written information, we multiplied this
measure by the minimal time informants estimated
for search: 30 percent of hours worked per week.
Control variables
We control for a range of alternative explanations
that may affect the number, quality, and novelty of
patents produced by each individual.
Type of search role. We include a dummy variable
taking the value 1 if an individual is a Distinguished
Engineer as they are appointed for their length
of employment within IBM. We also include a
separate dummy with the value 1 if an individual
is both a Distinguished Engineer and an Academy
member—meaning that the baseline is only those
elected to the Academy of Technology.
Hours worked per week. Individuals who work
more hours may be capable of more search time by
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virtue of spending more time at work. To control
for this, we include a measure of the average
number of hours worked every week as indicated
by survey data.
Tenure within the firm. We control for the effect
that tenure may have on individual’s experience in
developing information sources by measuring the
number of years an individual worked for IBM.
Several scholars have noted how individuals’ pace
in producing both publications and patents slows
down later in their careers (Allen and Katz, 1986;
Gruber et al., 2013). We thus include a main effect
and the squared effect to capture the possibility of
diminishing returns to tenure within the firm.
Academic publications. Because scientific pub-
lications can affect attention to external search
breadth (Katz, Tushman, and Allen, 1995), we con-
trol for scientific engagement by calculating the
number of scientific publications produced in the
last three years prior to the survey.
PhD degree. PhDs may be more likely to search
outside the firm and have broad external net-
works. We thus control for whether the scientists
and engineers have a PhD using a dummy vari-
able (e.g., Gruber et al., 2013). We collected these
data from individuals’ LinkedIn Profile, IBM’s
employee website, and through Google searches.
Gender. We coded a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the individual is male. We assessed this
by looking through LinkedIn web pages, and used
a name probability tool that gives a probability that
a person is male or female based on their name.
When uncertain, we corroborated this by looking
at the pictures of LinkedIn profiles and individual
web pages.
LinkedIn profile. The presence on professional
platforms such as LinkedIn allows people to
expand their professional network, potentially
allowing them to grow their external search
breadth. LinkedIn is by far the largest such network
with close to 300 million users. We thus created
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person had a
registered LinkedIn profile.
Estimation model
Our dependent variables are skewed with some
individuals accounting for a disproportionally
large share of patents. We normalized the patent
counts by the number of inventors to account for
individuals who collaborate with a large number
of patent inventors. We use a quasi-maximum
likelihood (QML) Poisson regression to predict
the patent outcomes, which has been shown to be
applicable even though the dependent variable is
not a count variable. Since the Poisson model is
in the linear exponential family, the coefficient
estimates remain consistent as long as the mean of
the dependent variable is correctly specified. QML
Poisson standard errors are consistent even if the
underlying data-generating process is not Poisson
(Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984). The
dependent variable is weighted by the number of
inventors on a patent, but the QML model can be
used when the dependent variable takes non-integer
values. QML Poisson is suitable because it imposes
little structure on the underlying data distribution
and is a more conservative estimate of the coeffi-
cients due to the larger standard errors compared to
negative binomial regressions.
In our models, we controlled for patents granted
prior to the survey by using lagged cumulative
dependent variables, which control for the innate
ability of people to produce more patents. It is
plausible that individuals who have been active
in the past in producing patents will continue to
do so in the future, and thus the lagged variable
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman
and Borjas, 1980; Stuart, 2000). Regressions with
lagged dependent variables produce consistent esti-
mates if error terms are uncorrelated over time.
Autocorrelation can affect other coefficient esti-
mates downwards (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010).
However, it is generally preferred to include lagged
dependent variables as omitting them can introduce
bias. Standard errors can also be potentially lower
in models with lagged dependent variables, result-
ing in overstating the significance tests. In supple-
mentary analyses, we excluded the lagged depen-
dent variables, and the results are substantially the
same as those reported in the paper. Standard errors
were also substantially the same, suggesting that too
small standard errors are not causing the significant
results. As themarginal effects are slightly lower for
what we report, we think our results show a lower
bound of the effects (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010).
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations among
the variables are presented in Table 1. The
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correlations between the independent and control
variables are relatively modest, suggesting that
multicollinearity is not a problem. However, the
dependent variable is highly correlated with the
lagged dependent variables. Table 2 presents the
results for the QML Poisson regressions predicting
the dependent variable (quantity of patents) mea-
sured after the survey was distributed, controlling
for the lagged cumulative number of patents before
the survey.
Model 1 is the baseline model that only includes
the control variables. Model 2 includes the main
effect of external search breadth and establishes a
positive linear relationship between external search
breadth and innovation outcomes. Model 3 adds the
squared term to test whether there are diminishing
returns to external search breadth. Model 4 adds
the main effects of attention to external people and
external written information. Model 5 includes an
interaction between attention to external people
and external written information. Models 6 and 7
replicate the prior two models by using an absolute
measure of attention rather than a relative measure
of attention. Model 8 adds squared effects for atten-
tion to external people and external written infor-
mation. Model 9 adds interaction variables between
external search breadth and attention to external
people and attention to external written informa-
tion. In addition to the variables of Model 9, Model
10 includes the interaction between external search
breadth and the squared effects of attention to exter-
nal people and external written information. In what
follows, we explain the logic driving these models.
External search breadth
Our first exercise was to assess the main effect
of external search breadth at the individual level
and its effect on innovation outcomes. Models
2–7 show a positive and significant main effect
of external search breadth on innovation outcomes
at the 1 percent level. Model 3 tested possible
nonlinearities and found that the squared effect was
insignificant. Thus, we can conclude that external
search breadth has a significant and linear positive
relationship with the number of patents produced.
Attention allocation
We analyzed the allocation of attention in two
different ways to reflect potential differences in
the effort exerted when searching either written or
human sources of information. Model 4 included
the main effect of attention to external people as
well as external information. The coefficient for
attention to external people was negative and sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level. Similarly, the coef-
ficient for attention to external written information
was negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
This finding suggests that attending to external writ-
ten information and external people actually low-
ered innovation outcomes for the average person
in our sample. We also assessed whether combin-
ing attention to external people and external written
information created additional advantages in Mod-
els 5 and 7. We tested the interaction effect between
the two, and the effect was insignificant.
In addition, we wanted to account for the possi-
bility of nonlinearities in attention between internal
and external information sources. We thus included
squared effects of allocation of attention to exter-
nal people and external written information. The
coefficient for attention to external people squared
was insignificant in Model 8, while the coefficient
for attention to external written information squared
was negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
This indicates that increased levels of attention
to external people as well as external information
decreased innovative outcomes. In contrast to what
prior research on the variance hypothesis would pre-
dict, the average person in our sample who allocated
more attention to external rather than internal infor-
mation sources of both types (people and written
sources) was less likely to produce patents.
Interaction effects between external search
breadth and attention allocation
Our reasoning has thus far assessed the effects of
external search breadth and attention to external
information sources independently and overlooked
how these conditions may jointly shape innova-
tion outcomes. As external search breadth increases,
people may need to allocate more attention to infor-
mation sources outside the firm in order to reapply
and recombine what is learned. Model 9 therefore
included interaction effects between external search
breadth and attention to external people as well
as written information. We also assessed poten-
tial nonlinearities by adding the squared effects in
Model 10. Our first conclusion is that allocating
attention to external people moderates the effect of
external search breadth on patents produced, while
allocating attention to external information does
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(a) (b)
Figure 1. (a, b) Predictivemarginal effects of external search breadthwith 95 percent confidence intervals at two different
levels of attending to external people (15th and 85th percentiles). These results are based on the estimates from Model 6
and 7, respectively
not. People who spent more time outside the firm
were only innovative if they also cultivated external
search breadth. Put differently, people gained more
from external search breadth when they allocated
more time to people outside the firm.
Interpreting the results is not trivial in nonlinear
models, and we thus plot the marginal effects at
two different levels of attention to external people.
Figure 1(a, b) plots the marginal effects at the 15th
and 85th percentiles of attention to external people
using the results from Model 9 (using only the
main effect of the attention variables) and Model
10 (including the squared of the attention variables),
respectively.
Three noteworthy findings emerge from these
figures. First, individuals who pay little attention
to external people (15th percentile) are unaffected
by increasing their external search breadth as a
horizontal line fits within the 95 percent confidence
intervals. Second, these individuals are consistently
innovative, and often more innovative than those
who allocate more attention to external people.
Third, individuals with high attention to external
people (85th percentile) gain the most from their
external search breadth. It is when attention and
breadth are coupled that people are the most innova-
tive. As onemember of theAcademywho spent a lot
of time on external search breadth explained: “We
talked to everyone we could think of that mattered
in the [technology] community to try and find out
what their views of it were. How they saw it playing
out, rather than just sitting inside IBM and specu-
lating [where] IBM people talk to other IBM people
and they get a consensus as to what they all think.”
This Academy member had deliberately broadened
his search breadth and was allocating more time
to it—relying on his Academy colleagues to
keep him up to date with events going on inside
the firm.
One way to interpret these results is to apply
Gouldner’s (1957) conception of locals and cos-
mopolitans. Locals, with low external search
breadth, still produced innovative outcomes if
they allocated their attention to colleagues inside
the firm. Indeed, many locals in our sample were
very innovative regardless of their external search
breadth. Cosmopolitans, with great external search
breadth, only produced greater innovative outcomes
when they allocated more attention to external peo-
ple. Taken together, these findings suggest that there
are two distinct but equifinal individual approaches
to a successful innovative search: a local approach
emphasizing attention to people inside the firm and
a cosmopolitan approach that cultivates and attends
to a broad network of external people.
As a post hoc analysis, we wanted to document
the extent of lower-performing search behavior. A
scatter plot of external search breadth and attention
to external people weighted by the number of
observations is illustrated in Figure 2. Echoing the
descriptive statistics, we see a weak (0.28) albeit
positive relationship between the variables. We
drew lines for the 25th and 75th percentiles for
the two variables to divide the sample into low
(25th percentile) versus high search breadth (75th
percentile) and low (25th percentile) versus high
(75th percentile) attention to external people. As
expected, most respondents were in the middle, and
the numbers in the respective corners in Figure 2
illustrate how many individuals fall into the corners
exhibiting either higher- or lower-performing
search behavior.
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of external search breadth and
attention to external people weighted by the number of
observations. A larger circle means that we have more
people who have this combination of external search
breadth and attention to external people. The solid lines are
drawn at the 25th and 75th percentiles to analyze people in
the four corners of low versus high attention of external
search breadth, and low versus high attention to external
people. The numbers in these corners illustrate the number
of observations we found in each corner to illustrate the
extent of those with behavior leading to lower innovation
outcomes. There is a weak positive correlation (0.28) as
illustrated in the descriptive statistics, but we observemany
different combinations
According to our results, the southwest and
northeast corners are where people are more
innovative, whereas the northwest and southeast
corners are characterized by lower-performing
innovative behavior. Of the people with high exter-
nal search breadth (75th percentile and above),
about 30 percent (17/(17+ 40)) demonstrated low
attention to external people and were “social but-
terflies.” These people cultivated broad networks,
but did not increase their attention to these external
people—spreading finite attention across a broader
variety of industry relationships. Conversely, at low
external search breadth (up to the 25th percentile),
we found that 33 percent (23/(23+ 47)) allocated
their attention to external people without cultivat-
ing search breadth—maintaining monogamous
relations to only one type of external partner.
These people spent a great deal of time outside
the organization but did not adequately cultivate
breadth among different types of ties. Thus, we
can conclude that (1) about a third of the sample
exhibited lower-performing search behavior, and
(2) that the extent of this behavior is similar for
both low and high external search breadth.
Our explanation for this result builds upon field
data collected from interviews and workshops.
Respondents with high external search breadth that
failed to adequately attend to external partners built,
as a result, a broad network of thin ties and were
unable to harness the benefits from these relation-
ships. Respondents who spent a great deal of time
outside the firm but did not cultivate external search
breadth failed to garner the requisite variety needed
for innovative outcomes. For instance, one person
with high attention to external people mentioned
how he only talked to people from universities.
That said, we explored other possible explanations
for these different patterns of search behavior by
investigating differences in the control variables
between higher- and lower-performing groups.
Table S3 in Appendix S1 compares descriptive
means between the two groups. We included an
additional question probing respondents about their
motivations for engaging with external partners to
test whether motivation affected whether they were
high or low performing. There are no significant
differences between these means for high- and
low-performing groups. Thus, we can rule out other
possible explanations, such as gender, education,
and motivation for search, lending more credence
to the explanations we propose.
Robustness checks
First, we conducted several robustness checks to
strengthen the inferences reported in Table S2 in
Appendix S1. An important consideration is that
not all patents are equal. Using two established
measures, we reestimated our models with two
additional dependent variables: novel patents and
quality-adjusted patents. Models 8 and 9 have novel
patents as the dependent variable, and Models 10
and 11 have quality-adjusted patents as the depen-
dent variable. There are some small differences
across the regressions, but the key findings reported
prevail: external search breadth remains positive
and significant, and the interaction effect between
external search breadth and attention to external
people is positive. In sum, our results are consistent
across all three dependent variables.
Second, we assessedwhether working in teams of
inventors or alone could affect the results. Models
12 and 13 ignore patents with a single inventor,
whereas Models 14 and 15 only look at single
inventor patents for each individual. These models
show some small differences, but the main result
persists: external search breadth remains positive
and significant, and attention to external people
moderates this relationship.
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Third, we did a median split of individuals’
allocation of attention to external people to assess
the effect of external search breadth at different
levels of attention. The marginal effects illustrated
in Figure 1(a, b) show that external search breadth
is beneficial only when coupled with more attention
to people outside the organization, but has no effect
at lower levels of attention to people outside the
organization. The positive effect between exter-
nal search breadth on innovation outcomes that
we found in the regressions is driven by people
who spend a large amount of time with external
people. We assessed whether this is reproducible
in a sample split and not an artifact of the many
covariates included in the regression. Model 16
shows the results of external search breadth at
below or equal to the median of attention to people
outside the organization. Model 17 shows the same
with the sample above the median.2 As expected,
the coefficient for external people is not significant
in the sample below the median and is positive
above the median. People who allocated more
attention to people outside the organization stood to
gain from external search breadth, whereas people
who focused on local colleagues were unaffected.
This underscores the robustness of the positive
interaction effect between external search breadth
and attention to external people.
Fourth, we found an unexpected negative effect
of the number of hours worked per week on
innovation outcomes. To assesses what drives
these results, we split this continuous variable into
three chunks (fewer than 40 hours, between 40 and
70 hours, and more than 70 hours). The results in
Models 18 and 19 show that the negative result is
driven by those who work more than 70 hours a
week, and that our basic results remain robust.
Fifth, we clustered standard errors based on the
location of individuals as people in the same coun-
tries could have similar innovation strategies. We
replicated Models 6 and 7 using location dummies
rather than clustered standard errors at the coun-
try level in Models 20 and 21. The results are very
similar to those using clustered standard errors by
location.
Sixth, we followed the approach suggested by
Imbens (2003) to perform a sensitivity analysis to
2 The number of observations in Models 8a and 8b are not exactly
the same as we have several observations at exactly the median.
The results are insensitive to different ways of splitting the sample
around the median.
show the degree to which omitted variable bias
could be responsible for the statistically significant
relationship between external search breadth and
innovation outcomes. This analysis shows how
strongly correlated an omitted variable must be to
be simultaneously correlated with a treatment or
independent variable and the dependent variable in
order to make the effect of the treatment variable
disappear (see Wang, 2014, for an application).
Building on Harada’s (2012) extension of Imbens,
we visually analyzed whether an omitted variable
is likely to exist and the conditions it would need
to fulfill, through three steps, using his generalized
sensitivity analysis. We found that it is unlikely
that an omitted variable would cause the effect of
external search breadth to disappear.
All of our robustness checks show that our
main findings are robust to alternative dependent
variables including the novelty and quality of
patents produced. The interaction effect between
external search breadth and attention to external
people is also visible in a sample split below and
above the median of attention to external people.
Our results are also robust to alternative ways to
measure the control variables, specifying the model
using country-specific dummies, and is unlikely to
suffer from omitted variable bias.
DISCUSSION
The discovery of novel ideas does not occur at
the firm level but is the cumulative result of inno-
vative search conducted by individuals (Laursen
and Salter, 2006; Li et al., 2013; Rosenkopf and
Almeida, 2003). Individuals in key scientific and
technical boundary spanning and search roles
can exact significant influence (Fleming and
Waguespack, 2007; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007),
affecting the alliances firms develop (Rosenkopf,
Metiu, and George, 2001) and the influence firms
exercise (Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010). The impli-
cation is that understanding how boundary spanners
straddle the firm and its external environment is
a key question for strategy. However, much of the
research on innovation search has focused on how
firms overcome problems of local search (Li et al.,
2013). Little is known as to how individual search
behaviors affect innovation outcomes (see Nerkar
and Paruchuri, 2005, for an exception). If firms
in dynamic environments are unlikely to benefit
from centralized search processes (Cohen and
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Levinthal, 1990), then it is critical that we develop
a rich understanding of how search strategies at the
individual level affect innovation outcomes.
The variance hypothesis has received a great
deal of support in prior research at firm, team,
and individual levels. On the whole, our research
confirms the variance hypothesis—on average,
individuals with greater external search breadth
were more innovative than those who collaborated
with a more narrow range of external people,
and this effect did not dissipate. However, little
research has accounted for the opportunity cost
associated with innovation search. While scholars
have theorized that external search breadth may
have its constraints at the firm level (Laursen and
Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010), research
designs rarely appreciate how boundary spanners’
allocation of attention, a finite resource, affects the
benefits that can be extracted from external search.
When we took into account the finite time
people have available and how they allocated
their attention, our results became more nuanced
by showing that the benefits of external search
breadth are moderated by individual’s allocation of
attention to external information sources. In doing
so, we discovered two equifinal search approaches
that led to innovative outcomes: (1) high external
search breadth coupled with high attention to
external information sources (cosmopolitans), or
(2) low external search breadth coupled with high
attention to internal information sources (locals).
As Figure 1(a) demonstrates, both the cosmopoli-
tan and local approaches to search can achieve
innovative results. Gouldner (1957) used the terms
cosmopolitans and locals to differentiate between
technical experts and company men. Our sample
were all technical experts within the same firm,
avoiding the unobserved heterogenity associated
with studies of multiple firms. Yet, we still uncover
variation in search strategies and effectiveness. Our
research demonstrates that no “one strategy fits
all” when it comes to predicting a successful inno-
vative search even among a common pool of elite
technical experts who act as boundary spanners.
The limits of external search breadth
While our research confirms that variance in
external search breadth is important to fostering
innovation, it also identifies a critical boundary
condition under which it can detract from inno-
vation outcomes. The effects of external search
breadth on innovation outcomes are conditioned on
how well individuals attend to people as sources
of information. The same does not hold with
respect to written information sources. This is
an important insight. External search breadth can
enable individuals to tap divergent mind-sets and
ideas (Allen, 1977; Ancona and Caldwell, 1992;
Tushman, 1977) when they devote adequate atten-
tion to the personal relationships under-riding those
information sources. Our results show that people
as external information sources take more time than
external written sources of information—possibly
in order to learn how external ideas developed in
one context can be reapplied elsewhere (Hansen,
1999; Murray and O’Mahony, 2007).
Although there are many ways to measure strong
and weak ties (Marsden and Campbell, 1984), if
one determination of strength is the degree to
which one spends time on those ties, then, in our
research, external search breadth is more effective
when coupled with strong rather than weak ties.
As one full-fledged cosmopolitan Academy mem-
ber explained: “I have tended to reduce the effort on
internal networking in my current role … [main-
taining a broad external network] takes significant
time and requires you to do this with genuine inter-
est, otherwise this is a waste. You have to remain
motivated to maintain contact even when there has
been no apparent value for many years.” This engi-
neer was deliberate in how he allocated his time, and
pulling back on internal networking allowed him to
both deepen and broaden his external ties.
The unexpected innovative power of locals
What would surprise Gouldner (1957) is that
locals (who lacked external search breadth and
allocated most of their attention to people inside
the firm) were highly innovative. Locals, in his
mind, demonstrated low commitment to external
reference groups, which would limit the “requisite
variety” needed to produce new innovations. But,
we found that locals produced more patents when
they allocated more absolute as well as more rela-
tive attention to people inside the firm. Even though
our sample was tasked with innovative search,
internal colleagues played a key role for many in
our sample. Few individuals spent the majority of
their time on external people, and this benefited
rather than detracted from innovative outcomes.
Thus, those who are not skilled at cultivating
external search breadth can still be innovative by
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focusing their attention on colleagues inside the
firm. Internal search can be a stable source of
innovation (e.g., Grant, 1996) in a firm the size of
IBM. As one Academy member explained, internal
search at IBM could be complicated:
The view from inside IBM of what IBM is and
how it behaves is nothing like what you see
from the outside. For instance, the image I
always had of IBM was that it was very slow.
Actually, it is too fast. Inside IBM there is
constant churn, just like Silicon Valley, of new
ideas and changing alliances. The outcome
is that the decisions that are visible on the
outside seem to take forever. But from the
inside it is the insane churn of new ideas, and
new alliances, you can’t even keep track of it,
it’s just insane.
Locals’ attention to internal affairs may thus be a
critical need for large firms competing in dynamic
innovation environments. In thismanner, localsmay
gain greater trust and access to internal informa-
tion than peers pursuing a “thin” external search.
Introducing new ideas into an organization’s prod-
ucts, processes, and systems requires “mutual own-
ership” (Fleming et al., 2007: 462), and attention to
internal colleagues can engender trust in a person’s
ability to bring people together in service of collec-
tive, creative outcomes (Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai,
2005; Long Lingo and O’Mahony, 2010; Obstfeld,
2005). Locals can innovate by focusing on internal
search and developing the relationships needed to
bring innovations to fruition rather than cultivating
external search breadth.
If these results seem intuitive, consider that this
was not the case for all in our sample. As Burt
argued: “network brokerage is a craft more than
a commodity so benefits typically vary widely
between people” (2010: 195). The social butterflies
in our sample conducted a thin external approach
to search without devoting adequate attention to
those ties. In this case, individuals incurred the
costs of cultivating external search breadth without
capitalizing on the benefits. The “monogamous
external” searchers allocated attention outside the
organization without developing search breadth
and were less innovative. These individuals spent a
great deal of time with the same types of external
partners—as a result of familiarity, history, shared
experiences, or enduring social relationships that
were not refreshed over time.
Our findings suggest that even talented senior
experts with search autonomy may have difficulty
determining how to allocate their attention to
achieve innovative results. Many individuals juggle
how to allocate their attention not just betweenwork
and home (Evans, Barley, and Kunda, 2004; Perlow,
1998) but between competing responsibilities at
work. For example, academics have to allocate
their attention between conducting research and
presenting it to a broader audience with implica-
tions for scholarly innovation and productivity. In
our research, neither the social butterfly approach
nor the monogamous external approach to search
was likely to lead to higher innovative outcomes.
Dedicated search roles were offered as a reward to
elite technical experts with a proven record of inno-
vation (e.g., Gambardella et al., 2013). Yet, even
within this sample, people have different strengths,
weaknesses, preferences, and capabilities, and
while some chart distinct search paths that leverage
their distinct skill sets, others have more trouble.
What is counterintuitive is that the most effective
search approaches operated at extremes—where
individuals allocate attention either inside or
outside the firm rather than trying to seek a balance
between the two as Allen (1977) predicted.
Individual search behavior
As a response to fluid, fast-paced, and mobile work
environments, firms often place individuals in key
search roles to enhance access to external sources
of information (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010;
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). In technical and
scientific industries, individuals in dedicated search
roles are often at the forefront of managing these
relationships, and their ability to do so has real
consequences for the firm (Dokko and Rosenkopf,
2010; Fleming and Waguespack, 2007; Rosenkopf
et al., 2001). Individuals in our study considered
themselves to be both scouts and representatives
for IBM: “I am going to this [conference] because
I am one of IBM’s representatives so I need to
keep my pulse on what is happening.” Technical
and scientific experts working in this capacity are
often rewarded with autonomy over their own work
(Bailyn, 1991; Gambardella et al., 2013; Katz et al.,
1995), but we know little about how these indi-
viduals navigate innovation search once receiving
this autonomy. Yet, this is critical to understanding
how knowledge from external sources is absorbed
and applied by the firm (Cohen and Levinthal,
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1990). Individuals’ external search breadth has
consequences for subsequent rates of innovation
for both individuals and the firm. One implication
is that individuals’ self-awareness of their own
search strengths and weaknesses may be critical
to crafting an effective innovation search strategy.
Rather than point to one formula, our research
suggests that at least two distinct search approaches
can be effective in producing innovative outcomes.
Limitations and directions for future research
Our findings have several limitations that open new
avenues for future research. The current literature
largely favors the external sourcing of innovations
(e.g., Dahlander and Gann, 2010), but in a firm as
large as IBM, internal resources can also be critical
to generating novel ideas. Thus, one boundary
condition to the generality of our results may be
firm size. Maintaining currency inside the firm can
present its own challenge in a firm as large as IBM.
Given IBM’s size, the amount of variance inside the
firm may be substantially more than what is avail-
able within smaller firms. An alternative but sym-
pathetic explanation is that, given IBM’s size and
competitive position, the translation of innovative
ideas into patents requires more internal coordina-
tion. Thus, we expect our findings to hold for large
global firms competing in dynamic environments.
The cross-sectional design of our study raises
several concerns about endogeneity. One concern
stems from the fact that we don’t know whether the
search patterns observed are a function of personal-
ity traits, preferences, experiences, or some combi-
nation.We account for survey respondents’ inherent
ability to patent using lagged cumulative dependent
variables. Our regressions include several variables
such as tenure inside the firm, education, and social
networking to account for differences in skills.
Despite these precautions, whether the results we
find are deliberate or unintentional behaviors cannot
be fully determined from our data. Future research
could examine how the different search patterns
we discovered parse among these possibilities
(e.g., Gruber et al., 2013). We are thus careful in
interpreting our results as causal, but rather as note-
worthy correlations with important implications.
Our sample is a select group of elite scientists
and engineers. The benefit of studying this group is
that they were all tasked with innovation search and
given the autonomy to do so within the same firm.
It was impossible to study individuals not hired
for these roles to parse out selection effects. But
the selection of this group is similar to all studies
of employees, as no organization that we know
would hire or promote people at random. While our
sample is a select group, it is useful for studying the
limits of the variance hypothesis. Our findings have
relevance for many firms of similar size that incor-
porate innovation boundary spanning, search, or
scouting roles. Field work could providemore detail
on the practices (Barley and Kunda, 2001) that
individuals used to manage external search breadth.
We investigated one type of innovation output
three ways (by using the volume, novelty, and
quality of patents produced), and while this output
was valued by IBM, other types of innovation
outcomes exist and would be important to consider
in situations where patents are an ineffective means
of appropriability. We were able to rule out some
alternative explanations that might drive different
patterns of search behavior. However, it is possible
that the scientists and engineers who were low
performing with respect to patenting outcomes
provided other benefits to the firm. One question
that remains is how the innovation outcomes we
measured affect firm performance in the near
and long term. Future research would do well to
uncover how the patents awarded to the engineers
and scientists we studied extend or renew a firm’s
portfolio. Doing so would illuminate how individ-
uals dedicated to search affect changes in firms’
performance overall. If recent research on open
innovation (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, and West,
2006; Dahlander and Gann, 2010) is any indication,
individuals in technical leadership positions are
likely to play increasingly important roles in firms’
innovation strategies and deserve our attention.
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